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TERRORISM IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
Juliet Sorensen*
INTRODUCTION
Few scholars disagree with the premise that terrorism must be prevented
and prosecuted, but many disagree with how to achieve this end. Successful
prevention and prosecution of terrorism requires not only the strategic use of
criminal laws and the laws of war to the best advantage, but also the accurate
identification and utilization of applicable law.
Too many policymakers on this issue have ignored its complexities in favor
of political expediency. The George W. Bush administration adopted the term
“War on Terror” and promised “victory over the enemy,” to the point where
this language has become part of America’s lexicon.1 As for how to confront
terrorism under the law, Bush administration lawyers took the position that the
law of war was inapplicable.2 By contrast, critics of the administration argued
that the 1949 Geneva Conventions precluded the fight against terrorism from
being treated as an international armed conflict.3
In most scenarios, international terrorism is not considered international
armed conflict under the law of war, which is based in the Geneva
Conventions and defines it as arising between “two or more of the High
Contracting Parties,” or states.4 While President Bush declared the tragedy of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* Juliet Sorensen is a Clinical Assistant Professor of Law with Northwestern University
Law School’s Center for International Human Rights.
1
Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President [George W. Bush] at the United
States Air Force Academy Graduation Ceremony, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 2, 2004),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040602.html
(“[W]e
will accept nothing less than victory over the enemy.”).
2
See David W. Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of
War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 959 (2009).
3
See, e.g., HELEN DUFFY, THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17–70, 250–55 (2005) (arguing that the conflict with al-Qaeda cannot be
characterized as an international or non-international armed conflict); Silvia Borelli, Casting
Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and Detentions Abroad in the “War on
Terror”, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 39, 46 (2005) (arguing that outside of Afghanistan and
Iraq, the “war on terror” should not be considered an armed conflict, but rather as law
enforcement on an international scale); Mark A. Drumbl, Judging the 11 September Terrorist
Attack, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 323, 323 (2002) (arguing that the September 11th attack should be
treated as a criminal attack and be addressed by international criminal law and process).
4
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter, collectively, Additional Protocols]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
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September 11, 2001, to be an act of war and individuals detained in the wake
of those attacks to be unlawful combatants,5 there exists little precedent for the
application of that label to non-state actors like al-Qaeda.6
The Obama administration has debated about how to treat terrorists in its
custody—are they prisoners of war, or are they criminal defendants?—and has
attempted to embrace both designations.7 Two days after his inauguration,
President Obama signed executive orders ending Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) “rendition,” or interrogation in prisons overseas, directing the closing of
the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, and ending the military commissions
instituted by President Bush for prosecuting detainees.8 After two years of
challenges to the implementation of these orders, however, Obama reversed
the earlier order halting new military charges and permitted military trials to
resume with new procedures.9 The administration says that it remains
committed to closing Guantanamo and to charging some suspects in civilian
criminal courts. But its efforts to increase the number of civilian criminal
proceedings for individuals detained at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, continue to be blocked by Congress. Congress has advanced its
own legislation that would require the government to place into military
custody any suspected member of al-Qaeda or an affiliate, including
individuals arrested on American soil.10 The Obama administration opposes
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter,
collectively, Geneva Conventions]. See also Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2461, 2471, 2475 (2008) (“[U]nder a narrow, strictly textualist reading of
the Geneva Conventions, the ‘war on terror’ is not an armed conflict.”).
5
See Exec. Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (characterizing the events of
September 11th as an attack “on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires
the use of the United States Armed Forces” (emphasis added)). Id. § 1(a).
6
Apart from the United States, Israel is the only other country to have consistently
characterized its actions against terrorist groups outside its borders as armed conflict. See
Balendra, supra note 4, at 2471 (citation omitted).
7
See, e.g., Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama, in Reversal, Clears Way for
Guantánamo Trials to Resume, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at A19 (describing disappointment
of civil liberties advocates that the military system remains in place); Kirk Lippold, Op-Ed.,
Obama’s
Invisible
Terror
Victims,
WASH.
TIMES,
June
22,
2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/22/obamas-invisible-terror-victims (asserting
that “the rights of detainees have overshadowed the rights of victims of terrorism.”).
8
See World Report 2010: United States, HUM. RTS. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/worldreport-2010/united-states (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
9
The new procedures guarantee detainees access to legal counsel and to a broader range
of classified information. See id.
10
See The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, S. 1867, 112th Cong.
(2011); see also Charlie Savage, Senate Approves Requiring Military Custody in Terror Cases,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
30,
2011,
at
A22,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/us/politics/senate-approves-military-custody-for-terrorsuspects.html (“‘I don’t believe fighting Al Qaeda is a law enforcement function,’ [Senator
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the legislation, citing the 2011 guilty plea by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the
“Underwear Bomber”) and recent charges of an Iranian plot to assassinate the
Saudi ambassador to the United States as examples of success in civilian
prosecutions of terrorists.11
Regardless of shifting political winds, and in spite of rulings by the
Supreme Court related to the detention facility at Guantanamo,12 basic
questions still lack definitive answers. The international law of war fails to
provide the right to try a detainee in a military tribunal if that person was not
detained in the course of armed conflict.13 Therefore, under the law of war,
many alleged international terrorists must be criminally tried—but in which
courts and on which charges?14
This article posits that the criminal justice system can serve as an effective
means of investigating and prosecuting some terrorists and that this
effectiveness is enhanced by the increasing ability to assert universal
jurisdiction over terrorists based on the compelling precedent of piracy law.
First, I discuss the definitions of the crimes of piracy and terrorism and how
those definitions have evolved over time. Second, I isolate and compare the
elements of each crime, noting similarities that are apparent and also those that
are less obvious. I cite aircraft piracy and hostage taking as examples of the
legal intersection of piracy and terrorism over which there is universal
jurisdiction and United States v. Moussaoui15 as a recent example of a criminal
prosecution for both crimes. Finally, I compare the extent to which universal
jurisdiction exists over each crime and argue that recent Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA) jurisprudence supports the principle that terrorism is a violation of the
law of nations, as do the Offences Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the
United Nations (U.N.) Charter. I conclude that the increasing treatment of
terrorism as a crime in violation of the law of nations, as reflected by the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Lindsey] Graham said. ‘I believe our military should be deeply involved in fighting these guys
at home or abroad.’”).
11
See Charlie Savage, Developments Rekindle Debate over Best Approach for Terrorism
Suspects,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
14,
2011,
at
A14,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/us/debate-is-renewed-over-approach-for-terrorismsuspects.html?pagewanted=all.
12
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (detainees at Guantanamo Bay
have the right to petition for writs of habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006) (military commission convened to try Hamdan may not proceed because it violates the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions).
13
See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591, 612 (authority to establish military tribunals derived
solely “from the powers granted jointly to the President and Congress in time of war”; the
“most basic precondition” for the establishment of military tribunals is “military necessity”)
(citations omitted). The Bush administration asserted that because these detainees were not
members of a legitimate national armed force, the Geneva Convention protections did not
apply to them; the Hamdan Court rejected this assertion. See id. at 628–29.
14
See Balendra, supra note 4, at 2473 (summarizing articles in which some commentators
argue that laws against terrorism should be enforced criminally, whereas others assert that the
conflict with al-Qaeda is an armed conflict under international law) (citations omitted).
15
382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
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expanding jurisdictional reach of terrorism statutes and based on the
antecedent of piracy, enables the criminal prosecution of many international
terrorists.
I. DISCUSSION
a. Pirates to Terrorists: More Cousins than Forefathers
i. The Definitions of Piracy and Terrorism
At first blush, the crime of terrorism is unique. The traditional
definition contemplates perpetrators who are non-state actors committing acts
of violence against a state in an international setting.16 In strongholds like the
Tora Bora region of Afghanistan, they may be “too . . . geographically remote
to be countered by traditional law enforcement.”17 Universal jurisdiction over
certain acts of terrorism means that the perpetrators lack the protection of
jurisdictional limitations that citizens of a nation-state enjoy as well as the
sovereign immunity enjoyed by states, placing them in what appears to be a
“legally distinct category of international criminals.”18 Thus, it would seem
that legal analogies to the crime of terrorism are scant.
Enter the pirates. Considered by many to be the contemporary
definition of piracy, Article 15 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas
defines the crime as “any illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft . .
. outside the jurisdiction of any State.”19 While the Geneva Convention on the
High Seas was enacted in 1958 and incorporates both air and sea piracy, the
crime itself is age-old. More than two thousand years ago, pirates were
defined in Roman law as hostis humani generis, enemies of the human race.20
Daniel Defoe, the prolific eighteenth-century author, described pirates as
stateless persons at “war against all the world.”21 Rampant piracy in the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16

See Douglas R. Burgess Jr., The Dread Pirate Bin Laden, LEGAL AFF. (July/Aug. 2005),
available
at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August2005/feature_burgess_julaug05.msp. Terrorism’s transnational aspect distinguishes the crime
from local or national crimes of violence against a state, such as treason.
17
Glazier, supra note 2, at 972.
18
Burgess, supra note 16.
19
Convention on the High Seas art. 15, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force
Sept. 30, 1962).
20
See Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New
International Law, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 298 (2006). Alberico Gentili, a
legal scholar of the Italian Renaissance, explains that:
[p]irates are common enemies, and they are attacked with impunity by all,
because they are without the pale of the law. They are scorners of the law of
nations; hence they can find no protection in that law. They ought to be
crushed by us . . . and by all men. This is warfare shared by all nations.
ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES 423 (1612), reprinted in 2 THE CLASSICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 423 (James Brown Scott ed., John C. Rolfe trans., William S. Hein &
Co., Inc. 1995).
21
DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE ROBBERIES AND MURDERS OF THE MOST
NOTORIOUS PIRATES 17 (Manuel Schonhorn, ed., Univ. S. Carolina Press 1972) (1724).

227

228

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2012

nineteenth century resulted in the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law
in 1856, signed by England, France, Spain, and most other European nations,
which abolished use of piracy for state purposes.22
The federal statute criminalizing piracy in the U.S. Code, 18 U.S.C. §
1651,23 does not contain a definition of the crime but rather outlaws piracy in
violation of the law of nations.24 However, piracy has been further defined in
two international conventions since the Geneva Convention on the High Seas.
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982,
defines piracy as a violent act committed “for private ends.”25 Some scholars
argue that this excludes terrorist acts, whereas others believe that this merely
excludes state-sponsored piracy from the convention and does not eliminate
acts committed for a political purpose by terrorists who are non-state actors.26
By contrast, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) does not contain the private
aims requirement of UNCLOS, but rather criminalizes specific acts of
aggression, including, inter alia, seizing control of a ship
by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; . . .
perform[ing] an act of violence against a person on board a ship
if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship;
or . . . destroy[ing] a ship or caus[ing] damage to a ship or to its
cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that
ship.27
For reasons historical and political, a single definition of terrorism in
international law is elusive.28 However, the definition provided by the U.S.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22

Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, April 16, 1856 (signed in Paris).
18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
24
Id. Recently, U.S. courts have differed as to the different activities encompassed by the
crime. In United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010), the district court found
that piracy was limited to sea robbery and that the definition of the crime and had not evolved
since a Supreme Court opinion on the issue in 1820. By contrast, a fellow district court judge
in the Eastern District of Virginia found that the definition of “piracy” has historically included
different types of conduct, not limited to the common law definition of robbery on land, and
that any unauthorized armed assault of directed violent acts on the high seas is piracy. See
United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010). Both cases are currently on
appeal to the Fourth Circuit, which has placed its ruling on Said in abeyance pending its ruling
on Hasan. United States v. Said, No. 10-4970 (4th Cir. 2010).
25
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
26
Milena Sterio, The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global
Solution, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1467 (2010).
27
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation art. III, ¶ 1, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1992)
[hereinafter SUA Convention].
28
Some organizations, such as the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) of Algeria in the
early 1960s, were viewed as “terrorists” by some nations and “freedom fighters” by others.
See MARTHA CRENSHAW HUTCHINSON, REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM: THE FLN IN ALGERIA,
1954–1962, at xiv (1978).
23
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Code is consistent with the term’s common usage in international law today.
18 U.S.C. § 2331 defines “international terrorism” as activities that:
(A)
involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States
or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or
of any State;
(B)
appear to be intended—
(i)
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii)
to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
(iii)
to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C)
occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms
of the means by which they are accomplished, the
persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek
asylum.29
Based on the statute’s focus on affecting governments and populations,
therefore, the ultimate intent of the perpetrators differs: terrorists commit acts
of terrorism to further political aims, whereas pirates commit acts of piracy for
monetary, private gains. This difference, however, has diminished over time
as some modern pirates act in furtherance of political goals.30 For example,
pirates operating in the 1990s in Southeast Asia’s Malacca Straits were
reportedly committing acts of piracy to support the Aceh separatist movement
fighting for autonomy and independence from Indonesia, including the
hijacking of an oil tanker in 2003.31 In addition, “[p]irates have smuggled
weapons and delivered them to terrorist groups and have financially
contributed to such groups.”32 Thus, the traditional aims of piracy and
terrorism have expanded and overlapped with time.
ii. The Elements of Piracy and Terrorism
The similarities between piracy and terrorism are heightened when the
elements of each crime are isolated and compared. First, the required mens rea
of both piracy and terrorism is knowledge, with intent to cause fear or sow
terror by “force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation” to achieve
their goals.33 The actus reus, or actions that constitute each crime, goes to the
earlier discussion of definitions. While actions constituting piracy under U.S.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29

18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
See Sterio, supra note 26, at 1458–59.
31
See id.
32
Id. at 1459–60 (citations omitted).
33
SUA Convention, supra note 27. See also Burgess, supra note 16.
30
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law were originally limited to sea robbery,34 that definition has expanded over
the years to include any unprovoked attack by sea.35 After the Achille Lauro
attack in 1985, during which an Italian cruise liner was seized by the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and a wheelchair-bound U.S. passenger was
murdered for political aims, the United States declared the perpetrators to be
“pirates” and demanded their extradition,36 even though no sea robbery had
occurred. A result of this incident was the enactment in 1988 of the SUA
Convention, which criminalizes “maritime terrorism.”37 The actus reus of
aircraft piracy, pursuant to the federal statute implementing the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (“Hague Convention”), is the
seizure, by force or violence, of any aircraft within the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States.38 Aircraft pirates may employ several
different strategies, including: interfering with flight crewmembers while
aboard such aircraft;39 carrying concealed weapons or explosives aboard such
aircraft;40 and committing certain crimes, including murder, manslaughter,
maiming, sexual abuse, assault, and robbery, while aboard such aircraft.41
Pirates and terrorists also use common means of committing their crimes,
including destruction of property, interference with commerce, and homicide.42
Thus, the modern actus reus of piracy encompasses maritime aggression and
terrorism, not just sea robbery.
Finally, while the locus of the crimes appears initially to be
fundamentally different—piracy occurs at sea, and terrorism does not—they
are not. In fact, the locus of piracy has never been so restricted; piracy can be
a “descent by sea” or the sacking of a town approached by sea.43 More
recently, piracy’s locus has included the skies, as demonstrated by the crimes
of air piracy and hijacking.44 Thus, the loci of the two crimes, like their
respective actus reus, have intersected.
iii. Hostage Taking and Aircraft Piracy: Where Piracy and
Terrorism Intersect
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34

United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 154 (1820) (“Robbery . . . upon the sea . . . is
piracy by the law of nations, and by the act of Congress.”).
35
For example, in the Washington Declaration of 1922, France, Italy, Japan, Great Britain,
and the United States pledged to punish any unprovoked attack by sea as an “‘act of piracy.’”
See Burgess, supra note 16.
36
See Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and
the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT’L. L. 269, 269–70 (1988).
37
SUA Convention, supra note 27.
38
49 U.S.C. § 46502 (2006).
39
See id. § 46504 (interfering with flight crewmembers and attendants).
40
See id. § 46505 (carrying a weapon or explosive on an aircraft).
41
See id. § 46506 (applying certain criminal laws to acts on aircraft).
42
Burgess, supra note 16.
43
Id.
44
See 49 U.S.C. § 44903 (2006) (discussing air piracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006)
(discussing hostage taking).

230

231

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2012

The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages treats
piracy and terrorism as a hybrid.45 First, the location of the crime of hostage
taking is not identified; the act could occur at sea, on land, or by air. Second,
the goal is not circumscribed; the act of hostage taking must occur only “in
order to compel a third person [namely, a State, an international
intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of
persons] . . . to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of the person detained.”46 This sharply contrasts with
the definition of “piracy” in older Geneva Conventions, referenced above, in
which the locus must be a ship or aircraft and the act must be committed “for
private ends.”47 The U.S. legislation implementing the convention, known as
the Hostage Taking Act, criminalizes hostage taking “whether inside or outside
the United States.”48 Among other bases for jurisdiction, jurisdiction over
hostage taking that occurs outside the United States is established under the
Hostage Taking Act if “the offender is found in the United States.”49 A
defendant is “found” in the United States if he is in U.S. custody, regardless of
how he came to be there.50
Similarly, the air piracy statute, or Antihijacking Act, “provides for
criminal punishment of persons who hijack aircraft operating wholly outside
the ‘special aircraft jurisdiction’ of the United States, provided that the hijacker
is later ‘found in the United States.’”51 The Antihijacking Act was enacted in
1974 to implement the Hague Convention, which requires signatory nations to
extradite or punish hijackers “present in” their territory.52 U.S. courts have
interpreted this language to allow for personal jurisdiction over defendants
whenever they are present before the court, irrespective of how that presence
was achieved.53
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45

See International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force June 3, 1983) (ratified and entered into force by the United
States Dec. 7, 1984).
46
18 U.S.C. § 1203(a).
47
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19; UNCLOS, supra note 25.
48
18 U.S.C. § 1203(a).
49
Id. § 1203(b)(1)(B). See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(finding universal jurisdiction over hostage taking and aircraft piracy committed by Yunis).
50
See Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1089–90. The FBI lured Yunis into international waters and then
placed him under arrest. See also United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1121, 1132 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (affirming conviction for aircraft piracy) (“’[F]ound’” means only that the hijacker
must be physically located in the United States, not that he must be first detected here.”). Cf.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that personal jurisdiction
exists over defendant found in United States despite his presence having been acquired by
forcible abduction from Mexico).
51
Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1092 (citing 49 U.S.C. App. § 1472(n)).
52
See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft art. 4, ¶ 2, Dec. 16,
1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 106 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
See also H.R. REP. NO. 93-885 at 10 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3978; S.
REP. NO. 93-13, at 1, 3 (1973).
53
See, e.g., Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1092 (“This [language] suggests that Congress intended the
statutory term ‘found in the United States’ to parallel the Hague Convention's ‘present in [a
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Moussaoui is an example of a terrorist charged under U.S. criminal law
for, inter alia, acts of piracy. On December 11, 2001, Zacarias Moussaoui was
indicted by a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia on six felony
charges: conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries, conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, conspiracy to destroy
aircraft, conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to murder
U.S. employees, and conspiracy to destroy property.54 The indictment alleged
an agreement to carry out a coordinated air attack.55 The count of conspiracy
to commit aircraft piracy charged that Moussaoui “agreed to commit aircraft
piracy, by seizing and exercising control of aircraft in the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States by force, violence, threat of force and
violence, and intimidation, and with wrongful intent, with the result that
thousands of people died on September 11, 2001.”56 On April 22, 2005,
Moussaoui pled guilty to all counts in the indictment.57 The Moussaoui case
demonstrates that terrorism has enough in common with piracy, including the
trend towards universal jurisdiction, that there is no obvious bar to pattern its
legal treatment after that of piracy.
b. The Justification for Universal Jurisdiction Over Piracy and
Terrorism
i. Piracy
Universal jurisdiction is a doctrine by which States can assert
jurisdiction over certain crimes that occur outside their territory without any
relationship to the nationality of the victim or the defendant.58 As implied by
the Geneva Convention’s references to attacks occurring on the “high seas” or
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
contracting state’s] territory’ . . . . Moreover, Congress interpreted the Hague Convention as
requiring the United States to extradite or prosecute ‘offenders in its custody,’ evidencing no
concern as to how alleged hijackers came within U.S. territory.”) (citations omitted).
54
United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004). While conspiracy is one of
the most popular charges in a prosecutor’s arsenal, four justices in Hamdan who joined in the
majority holding also found that conspiracy, one of the charges levied by the military
commission against Hamdan, is not a violation of the laws of war. A sampling of recent
prominent federal criminal prosecutions of terrorism show that conspiracy was charged on
each occasion. See, e.g., Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453; United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d
708 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (RICO conspiracy); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999)
(discussing seditious conspiracy, bombing conspiracy, conspiracy to murder Mubarak).
55
United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 484 (E.D. Va. 2003) (citation
omitted) (indicting Moussaoui).
56
Indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Count 2, ¶ 2,
http://www.justice.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
57
United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2010).
58
See Miriam Cohen, The Analogy Between Piracy and Human Trafficking: A Theoretical
Framework for the Application of Universal Jurisdiction, 16 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201,
201 (2010); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987) (“A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of
terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present.”).
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“in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state,”59 pirates have long been held
to be international criminals subject to universal jurisdiction, such that any
country may arrest and prosecute them, wherever they are found. For example,
U.S. law criminalizes “who[m]ever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or
found in the United States.”60 This sharply contrasts with other crimes that
take place at sea: crimes committed on board a ship generally come under the
jurisdiction of the state whose flag the ship flies, as ships have traditionally
been considered a “floating part” of that state’s territory.61 Pirate ships,
however, fly the flag of no nation.62 The universal jurisdiction doctrine applies
to piracy on the high seas based on the rationale that piracy impacts
international navigation and commerce and therefore threatens the
international community of nations. The SUA Convention authorizes any
nation to pursue an attacking vessel, as long as it is in international transit, and
to prosecute the offender.63 The location of the crime, on the high seas or in
the air, as well as its nature, also support the consensus that universal
jurisdiction should apply. The prohibition of piracy has risen to the level of jus
cogens in customary international law, meaning that it is one of the few
crimes—along with genocide, slavery, torture, crimes against humanity, and
recently, as this paper argues, terrorism—that violate customary international
law and to which universal jurisdiction applies.64
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Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19.
18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (emphasis added). U.S. law, like international law, requires
that acts of piracy take place in international waters. “Because the crime of piracy is closely
linked to the idea of universal jurisdiction, if the scope of piracy extends into a state’s
territorial waters, the universality of the crime collides with the territorial sovereignty of that
state.” Sterio, supra note 26, at 1467–68. Due to the lack of an effective national government
in Somalia, the U.N. Security Council made a special temporary exception with respect to that
country in 2008, authorizing the pursuit of pirates into Somali waters. See S.C. Res. 1816,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008).
61
Exceptions to this rule exist in both statute and case law. See, e.g., Marijuana on the
High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96–350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980), repealed by Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70507 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (criminalizing
possession with intent to distribute any controlled substance on board any vessel, including a
foreign vessel subject to treaty or other arrangement between a foreign government and the
United States, enabling U.S. authorities to enforce upon such vessel the laws of the United
States); United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. La. 1998) (denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss indictment of sexual abuse of a minor on board a vessel flying the flag of
Liberia because of lack of jurisdiction, given that ship was not an American vessel in light of
objective territorial and passive personality principles).
62
Cf. Rose George, Op-Ed, Flying the Flag, Fleeing the State, N.Y. TIMES, April 25,
2011, at A25 (“Ships used to fly the flags of their nation. They were floating pieces of their
home country . . . [b]ut in the early 20th century, this began to change. Panama, seeking to
attract American ships avoiding Prohibition laws, allowed non-Panamanians to fly its flag, for
a fee. Liberia and other countries followed suit. [Today,] [t]hanks to a system of ship
registration called ‘flags of convenience,’ it is all too easy for unscrupulous ship owners to get
away with criminal behavior.”).
63
See SUA Convention, supra note 27, art. 4, 7.
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See BOSELAW A. BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 20 (2005).
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ii. Terrorism
Jurisdiction over acts of international terrorism, while not universal, is
growing broader. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b provides expansive jurisdictional bases
for the United States to prosecute international acts of terrorism, including the
use of any facility of interstate or foreign commerce; the victim’s relationship
to the United States (not limited to U.S. citizens); the target of the attack
owned, possessed, or leased by the United States; if the offense is committed
in the territorial sea of the United States; and if the offense is committed within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.65 In
addition, the statute expressly authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction over the
crime.66
The USA PATRIOT Act and legislation implementing treaties on
terrorist bombings and on financing terrorism also enlarged the extent of
federal extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.67 Congress has enacted laws
proscribing various common law crimes such as murder, robbery, or sexual
assaults when committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, i.e., when committed aboard an American vessel or within
a federal enclave.68 The USA PATRIOT Act provides that the overseas
establishments of federal entities and staff residences, such as embassies,
consulates, and embassy and consular residences, be within the special
territorial jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of crimes committed by
or against U.S. nationals.69 Thus, the jurisdictional bases to prosecute
international terrorism are far more expansive than is typical.
1.
Universal Jurisdiction, Terrorism and the Alien
Tort Claims Act
The argument for expanding universal criminal jurisdiction over
terrorists receives some support from recent Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)
jurisprudence.70 The ATCA recognizes a private cause of action for torts in
violation of the law of nations.71 Violations of the law of nations have been
held by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain to include offenses
against ambassadors, violation of safe conducts, and piracy.72 Sosa requires
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See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2006 & Supp. 2008) (effective Sept. 26, 2008) (prohibiting acts
of terrorism transcending national boundaries).
66
See id. § 2332b(e).
67
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
377, 115 Stat. 272, 342 (2001) [hereinafter PATRIOT Act].
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See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006) (discussing murder); 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006)
(discussing robbery); 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006) (effective Dec. 26, 2007) (discussing
aggravated sexual abuse all within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States).
69
See PATRIOT Act § 804, 115 Stat. 377 (discussing jurisdiction over crimes committed
at U.S. facilities abroad).
70
See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
71
See id.
72
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723–28 (2004).
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“any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of [those] 18th-century paradigms . . .
.”73 Two recent cases, Mwani v. bin Laden74 and Almog v. Arab Bank,75 have
recognized specific acts of terrorism, including bombing an embassy and
bombing civilians, as acts in violation of the law of nations. I discuss each
case briefly in turn.
2.
Mwani v. bin Laden
In Mwani, the plaintiffs contended that al-Qaeda and bin Laden
bombed the U.S. embassy in Tanzania in 1998, also intending to kill
diplomatic personnel inside, as an act of terrorism.76 The court cited Sosa for
the premise that the eighteenth-century paradigm of the ATCA included piracy
and “‘assault against an ambassador,’” directly applicable to the embassy
bombings at issue in this case.77 Accordingly, the court found that this was a
tort in violation of the laws of nations actionable under the Act: “The
plaintiffs’ contention that bin Laden and al Qaeda [sic] attacked the American
embassy intending, among other things, to kill American diplomatic personnel
inside, would appear to fall well within those paradigms.”78
3.
Almog v. Arab Bank
In ruling on a motion to dismiss the complaint filed in Almog, the
district court found that the ATCA provided subject matter jurisdiction over
the bankrolling of random attacks on innocent civilians, or terrorist financing.79
The district court cited to the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings80 and the International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism,81 both implemented by the United States,82 which
proscribed methods of attacking civilians and financing those acts,
respectively. The district court further noted that under the customary law of
armed conflict as reflected in the Geneva Conventions, all parties to a conflict,
including non-state parties, must adhere to the prohibition against attacks on
innocent civilians.83 Finally, the district court acknowledged that while there
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Id. at 725.
See Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
76
See Mwani, 417 F.3d 13 n. 12 (citations omitted).
77
Id. at 14 n. 14 (citation omitted).
78
Id.
79
See Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d, at 285.
80
Id. at 276; see generally International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, at 1, U.N. Doc A/RES/52/164 (Jan. 9, 1998) (condemning
terrorist bombings).
81
See Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 277; see generally International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, at 1, U.N. Doc A/RES/54/109
(Dec. 9, 1999) (condemning financing of terrorist activity).
82
See 18 U.S.C. § 2332f (2006) (implementing the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings); 18 U.S.C. § 2339c (2006) (implementing the Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism).
83
See Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 279 (citation omitted).
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may be no consensus in international law on the definition of terrorism, the
suicide bombings and other acts of violence against civilians alleged in the
complaint, however labeled, are universally condemned.84 Therefore, the court
concluded, the universal condemnation of systematic suicide bombings and
other murderous acts intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population
violates the law of nations and is a cause of action under the ATCA.85
Two additional sources of law bolster the argument that non-state
sponsored terrorism is a violation of customary international law. First,
Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the U.S. Constitution confers on Congress
the power to “define and punish . . . [o]ffences against the Law of
Nations.”86 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the plurality opinion observes that this
clause vests in Congress the “constitutional authority to ‘define and punish .
. . [o]ffences against the Law of Nations.’”87 Congress has exercised this
authority by outlawing both piracy and certain types of terrorism and
terrorist-related behavior, such as terrorist financing.88 For example,
Congress expressly exercised its authority under the Offences Clause in
passing Title III of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996.89 Section 301(a)(2) of Title III provides:
The Congress finds that . . . the Constitution confers upon
Congress the power to punish crimes against the law of nations
and to carry out the treaty obligations of the United States, and
therefore Congress may by law impose penalties relating to the
provision of material support to foreign organizations engaged
in terrorist activity.90
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See id. at 276–80 (“In any event, in this case, there is no need to resolve any definitional
disputes as to the scope of the word ‘terrorism,’ for the Conventions expressing the
international norm provide their own specific descriptions of the conduct condemned.”) See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
58.
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See Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 284–85. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the D.C.
Circuit declined to find that terrorism was a violation of the law of nations. See Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984), in which the D.C. Circuit opined:
While this nation unequivocally condemns all terrorist attacks, that sentiment
is not universal. Indeed, the nations of the world are so divisively split on
the legitimacy of such aggression as to make it impossible to pinpoint an
area of harmony or consensus. Unlike the issue of individual responsibility,
which much of the world has never even reached, terrorism has evoked
strident reactions and sparked strong alliances among numerous states.
Given this division, I do not believe that under current law terrorist attacks
amount to law of nations violations. Id.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 601 (2006) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10).
88
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (piracy); 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2006) (international
terrorism); 18 U.S.C. § 2332f (2006) (terrorist bombings); 18 U.S.C. § 2339c (2006) (terrorist
financing).
89
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996).
90
Id. § 301(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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These criminal statutes reflect binding congressional definitions of
violations of customary international law and thus identify conduct that may
be subject to the ATCA and universal jurisdiction.
Another source of customary international law prohibiting terrorism
is Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The U.N. Security Council has passed a
number of binding resolutions pursuant to Chapter VII that recognize
international terrorist acts as violations of customary international law. For
example, among the “international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism” that are incorporated by reference in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1566 are the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Financing and the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings, both cited by the Almog court, discussed above.91 As a
result, terrorists committing acts in violation of U.S. law and the U.N.
Charter are committing violations of customary international law that are
actionable under Resolution 1566.
CONCLUSION
If terrorism were treated as a crime in violation of the law of nations,
terrorists, like pirates, would be properly understood as enemies of all states.
Universal jurisdiction is a powerful tool that can and should enhance criminal
prosecutions of terrorists. As the United States gains experience and
confidence criminally prosecuting international terrorists, the executive branch
should choose criminal prosecution to address terrorism whenever possible, as
it can be both legal and effective.
.
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See supra notes 80–81.
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